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I. Introduction
The fourth amendment1 is a revolutionary construct. It was in-
tended by the constitutional framers to safeguard the people of the re-
public from the arbitrary exercise of governmental authority.2 Among
the most offensive abuses during colonial history which motivated its
ratification were writs of assistance3 and general warrants.4 Under
color of the crown, agents of the sovereign exposed the colonists to in-
discriminate general rummaging and ransacking. At will, and often-
times without a whisper of suspicion, petty tyrants could enter homes
and destroy possessions under guise of a sanctioned contraband search. 5
A man's home was, to be sure, no longer his castle.
The attitude of the constitutional framers was forcefully restated
by the Supreme Court ninety five years later in Boyd v. United States:
1.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. M. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 497 (1978).
3. Writs of assistance were used by custom house officers for the purpose of de-
tecting goods smuggled into the colonies. The writ was not returnable to the sovereign's
magistrate following its execution, operated as a continuing license to search and seize,
and empowered the executing official to search wherever goods were suspected. N. LAs-
SON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 59-60 (1937).
4. See id. at 81 n.10 and E. CORWIN. THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS
TODAY 301 (13th ed. 1973). General warrants are defined as English process which
was issued for the arrest of persons charged with having libeled the state. The warrants
were issued officially and without naming an individual sought. In 1766, the House of
Commons voided their further usage. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (5th ed. 1979).
5. N. LASSON, supra note 3, at 60. For historical background reviews of the
fourth amendment by the Supreme Court, see Standford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-
485 (1964), Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property at 104 E. Tenth St., Kansas City,
Missouri, 367 U.S. 717, 724-729 (1961), and Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363-
365 (1958).
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a person's security, liberty, and the privacy of his property were sacred
rights, not to be defeased by the invasions of government. 6 The use of
warrants might seem inimical when the Court has so clearly inter-
preted the fourth amendment as subordinating the authority of the gov-
ernment to the rights of its citizens. The amendment, however, does not
proscribe all searches, only those which are unreasonable. And when a
warrant to search is sought, the neutrality of the judiciary is interposed
between public authority and the individual. In recent times, the ra-
tionale of the warrant process has been explained simply in the follow-
ing manner. The requirement that a warrant be secured from a magis-
trate before a search, is justified on the theoretical premise that a
neutral and detached magistrate is more impartial than an officer
whose duty is to zealously enforce criminal laws.7 This requirement
also provides some assurance that the information giving rise to the
search request was not manufactured after the event.8
In 1919, with the attention of the nation no longer diverted to the
war in Europe, its focus was drawn to another conflict, the war of pro-
hibition at home. The eighteenth amendment was ratified in that year
as a proscription against the "manufacture, sale, or transportation of
intoxicating liquors."9 That addition was anomalous to the Constitu-
tion. To the mind of one observer, it was ill-considered and had nothing
to do with regulating the exercise of the federal powers, or with the
6.
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitu-
tional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of
the case then before the court, with its ambitious circumstances; they ap-
ply to all invasions, on the part of the Government and its employees, of
the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the break-
ing of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the
essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that right
has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
7. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1947).
8. Adams v. Williams, 467 U.S. 143, 152 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Judge Friendly's dissent in Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1970)).
See Gardner, Searches and Seizures of Automobiles and Their Contents: Fourth
Amendment Considerations in a Post-Ross World, 62 NEB. L. REV. 1, 4 (1983).
9. "After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the expor-
tation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to jurisdiction thereof for
beverage purposes is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1.
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framework of government."0
To augment the eighteenth amendment, Congress passed the Na-
tional Prohibition Act. 1 This enactment provided, in part, a directive
to seize, take possession, and arrest any person discovered in the act of
transporting illegal intoxicating liquor. 2 In 1925, the Supreme Court
was asked to consider an arrest made under authority of the Act. At
the horns of the legal dilemma was a basic contradiction represented by
the fourth amendment on the one hand and the National Prohibition
Act as the handmaid of the eighteenth amendment on the other. It was
against the backdrop of the fourth amendment's time honored protec-
tions from unreasonable searches and the Court's later restatement of
those guarantees in Boyd that the arrest would be measured.
In its 1925 landmark decision, United States v. Carroll,3 the Su-
preme Court favored federal agents engaged in the war against the
transportation of intoxicating liquors and thereby sharpened the teeth
of the National Prohibition Act. When a federal agent had probable
cause to believe that a particular vehicle was transporting contraband,
the vehicle's ready mobility practically precluded the agent's securing a
warrant to search. Automobiles, the Court concluded, must necessarily
be excepted from the warrant requirement.
Although sixty years have passed, Carroll's principal tenet has
survived. The lynchpin which continues to justify warrantless automo-
bile searches is mobility of the vehicle. It should be noted in passing
that the eighteenth amendment 4 and the National Prohibition Act1 5
10. H. HORWILL, THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 13-14 (1925)
(Reissued 1969).
11. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, § 26, 41 Stat. 305 (1919).
12.
When the commissioner, his assistants, inspectors, or any officer of the law
shall discover any person in the act of transporting in violation of the law,
intoxicating liquors in any wagon, buggy, automobile, water or air craft, or
other vehicle, it shall be his duty to seize any and all intoxicating liquors
found therein being transported contrary to law. Whenever intoxicating
liquors transported or possessed illegally shall be seized by an officer he
shall take possession of the vehicle and team or automobile, boat, air or
water craft, or any other conveyance, and shall arrest any person in charge
thereof.
41 Stat. 305, 315 (1919).
13. United States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
14. The eighteenth amendment was repealed effective December 5, 1933 by U.S.
CONsT. amend. XXI.
15. The National Prohibition Act was repealed in large part by ch. 740 title I, §
1986] 1247
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which gave form to the opinion were repealed in the 1930's. Carroll's
continuing viability serves to underscore the significance of the Su-
preme Court's contribution to the evolving character of the fourth
amendment.
It is not surprising that the automobile exception would one day be
tested on what has in the 1980's become a common place user of the
roadways - the motor home. The Court in California v. Carney"6 re-
cently concluded that a motor home, within the context of the fourth
amendment, is more like a car than a home. Although the decision
attempts to define an objective standard under which a motor home
may be searched without a warrant, it must appear to some that the
fourth amendment protections against the indiscriminate and arbitrary
exercise of governmental authority - those evils which fired the caul-
dron of revolution - have paled in significance.
This Case Comment will examine the Carney decision and offer an
historical recounting of the automobile exception in the context of its
fourth amendment origin.
II. The Automobile Exception
Only under limited circumstances have warrantless searches re-
ceived the Court's imprimatur. In Katz v. United States, Justice Stew-
art wrote, "[s]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions. ' 17 Among those appears the automobile
exception, which was established by the Court in Carroll. Excepted
from the warrant requirement was the search of an automobile "for
contraband goods where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, be-
cause the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdic-
tion in which the warrant must be sought."' 8 This language provides
1, 49 Stat. 872 (1935).
16. California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985).
17. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). For a commentary on the
circumstances when warrantless searches and seizures have been authorized, see W. LA
FAVE, 2 SEARCH AND SEIZURE 3-6 (1978). Major exceptions to the warrant require-
ment were noted to be, search incident to a lawful arrest, search under an emergency
setting where loss or destruction of evidence is feared, and search with consent. See
also Comment, The Automobile Exception: A Contradiction in Fourth Amendment
Principles 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 933, 934-935 (1980).
18. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
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the precise point from which the automobile exception developed. Be-
cause a motor home can be quickly moved, Carroll's principal holding,
the Court reasoned, was equally applicable to motor homes.19 Carroll's
precedential value demands its review in this Comment.
The Carroll decision arose out of the prohibition era seizure of
bootleg whisky. Carroll and his companion were stopped by prohibition
agents and a state officer as their Oldsmobile roadster was enroute
from Detroit to Grand Rapids, Michigan on December 15, 1921.20 A
search of the vehicle was conducted without a warrant. The search ex-
tended behind the seat upholstery of the lazyback where the agents
uncovered sixty-eight bottles of concealed contraband whisky and gin.21
Appealing their convictions, the defendants contended that the
search and seizure violated their fourth amendment rights.22 The Court
affirmed the convictions and held that the officers were justified in con-
ducting the search and seizure,23 though no precedent was cited.24 It
further held that the National Prohibition Act expressly provided for
the seizure and arrest. 5
The Carroll Court's creativity appears in its analysis of Congress'
intent. Congress, the Court inferred, intended to except road vehicles
from the warrant requirement. 2 The Court acknowledged that fourth
amendment constructions since the founding of the republic focused
upon the reasonableness of searches while also distinguishing searches
19. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2066.
20. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 135.
21. Id. at 136. On redirect examination, one officer who was present at the scene,
described the Carroll roadster search in the following manner: "[tihe lazyback was
awfully hard when I struck it with my fist. It was harder than upholstery ordinarily is
in those backs; a great deal harder. It was practically solid. Sixty-nine [sic] quarts of
whiskey in one lazyback." Id. at 174 (Reynolds, J., separate opinion).
22. Id. at 135.
23. Id. at 162. The Court took judicial notice of the fact that Detroit's position
on the international border with Canada made it an active smuggling center. See
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 166 (1949). The Carroll court found probable
cause existed because Carroll and his companion were known to have been principals in
a proposed undercover sale two months previous, the automobile was identical to that
Carroll was seen in the night of the proposed sale, and the automobile was traveling
westerly from the direction of Detroit. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 160. In Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), Justice Powell (concurring) adds clarification,
noting that a Carroll search necessarily requires that probable cause be supported by
"specific knowledge about a particular automobile." Id. at 281.
24. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149.
25. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, § 26, 41 Stat. 305, 315-16, (1919).
26. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 147.
1986] 1249
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of structures and vehicles.2 7 An amendment to the Act imposed misde-
meanor penalties upon officers who conducted building searches "mali-
ciously and without probable cause."'28 However, both the Act and its
Amendment were mute as to searches of vehicles. Congress was in-
ferred therefore to have left the way open for the holding in Carroll.29
Because Carroll's roadster could be quickly moved, prohibition agents
were justified in conducting a search of the entire vehicle for contra-
band liquor and foregoing the rigors of the warrant process. 30
One interesting development in the Carroll analysis was fashioned
by a divided Court in Chambers v. Maroney.3 1 In 1970, the Justices
considered a challenge to the admission of evidence which had been
seized without a warrant from the defendant's automobile. It is note-
worthy that the vehicle was impounded at the police station at the time
of the search,3 2 and not on the open road. What exigencies existed to
justify the vehicle search in Carroll all but evaporated with the vehicle
seizure in Chambers. Police had probable cause however to arrest the
defendant.38 Justice White wrote: "[f]or constitutional purposes, we see
no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before
presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other
hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. ' 34 Justice
Stewart later characterized Chambers in the following way: "where the
police may stop and search an automobile under Carroll, they may also
seize it and search it later at the police station. '8 5
In 1974, a second prong in the search analysis emerged. Justice
Blackmun, writing for a plurality in Cardwell v. Lewis, reasoned that
since a car's occupants and contents were in plain view and cannot
evade public scrutiny, one's expectation of privacy was less than in a
27. Id. at 153.
28. An Act Supplemental to the National Prohibition Act, ch. 134, § 6, 42 Stat.
222, 223-224 (1921).
29. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 147.
30. For a reference of other Supreme Court decisions which relied upon vehicu-
lar mobility, see infra note 56 and accompanying text.
31. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
32. Id. at 44.
33. Id. at 46-47. Observers in addition to the victim of the armed robbery re-
ported to police that one of the four suspects was wearing a sweater, another a trench
coat, and that they had fled in a "light blue compact station wagon." Within an hour,
police stopped a vehicle which, along with its occupants, matched the description
provided.
34. Id. at 52.
35. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 463 (1971).
1250 [Vol. 10
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home.36 The case differed factually from all car search cases which had
been decided to that point.37 The defendant was requested to appear at.
the Office of the Division of Criminal Activities for questioning in con-
nection with a murder investigation. Later police executed an arrest
warrant. The defendant released his car keys and claim check from a
nearby public lot in which his car was parked.38 The car was then im-
pounded. Without a warrant, police examined the car's exterior by
matching tire tread impressions and paint scrapings with crime scene
samples.39 The defendant objected unsuccessfully to the admission of
evidence from this "search." Justice Blackmun concluded that the ex-
amination of a car's exterior was not unreasonable under the
circumstances.40
In what was prophetic dictum, Justice Blackmun observed that a
motor vehicle "seldom serves as one's residence."''1 As a legal conclu-
sion, the Justice's'prescience was realized eleven years later in Carney.
The rationale of the two decisions differed in one major respect, how-
ever. Since the clear emphasis of the Court's reasoning in Carney was
on vehicular mobility, Cardwell's plain view rationale serves little to
advance one's understanding of how the Carney motor home exhibited
a reduced expectation of privacy with the interior drapes drawn.42 A
reasonable conclusion is that, as to motor homes, mobility and not plain
view justifies the application of the warrant exception.
One further automobile case, Coolidge v. New Hampshire,43 helps
to make clear the foundation upon which Carney was formed. In yet
another plurality opinion,44 Justice Stewart applied the brakes to the
automobile exception. Carroll, the Justice concluded, was not intended
36. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974). Justice Blackmun was joined by
Chief Justice Burger, Justice White and.Justice Rehnquist. Justice Powell filed a con-
currence. iGeneral guidelines in this area were provided in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967). "What a person knowingly exposes to the public ... is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection ... [b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even
in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351.
37. Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 588.
38. Id. at 587.
39. Id. at 588.
40. Id. at 592.
41. Id. at 590.
42. See infra note 67.
43. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
44. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion, parts of which were joined by Justices
Douglas, Brennan and Marshall.
1986] 1251
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to extend to the Coolidge facts.4 5 Approximately two hours after the
defendant's arrest pursuant to a magistrate's warrant, police im-
pounded his two automobiles under authority of a search warrant. 46
Over the following fourteen months, police conducted three vehicle
searches.47 Both the seizure and subsequent station house searches were
held unconstitutional. 48 In what has become often quoted rhetoric, Jus-
tice Stewart remarked that "[t]he word 'automobile' is not a talisman
in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disap-
pears. ' 49 The absence of exigent circumstances rendered the Carroll
search standard inappropriate.50 The defendant posed no police threat
because he had been cooperative throughout the police murder investi-
gation although he was presented with sufficient opportunity to have
destroyed incriminating evidence. Furthermore, because police sus-
pected for a period of time that the defendant's car was related to the
crime, 5 1 ample opportunity existed to secure a valid search warrant.52
III. California v. Carney, The Case
The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) received uncorroborated
information that a motor home had been used for the purpose of ex-
changing marijuana for sex. 53 A private organization known as "We
Tip," an acronym for We Turn In Pushers, furnished DEA with this
information in previous communications by letter and telephone.5 4 As
the Dodge Mini Motor Home stood parked in a downtown San Diego
public lot on May 31, 1979, surveilling agents noted the correspon-
dence of its license plate and that of the motor home described in the
earlier tips. 55 Mr. Carney and another person entered the home and
drew the interior window shades. 56 The companion exited one and one-
45. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 458.
46. Id. at 447.
47. Id. at 448.
48. Id. at 473.
49. Id. at 461.
50. Id. at 462.
51. Id. at 460.
52. Id. at 472.
53. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2067.
54. People v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 595, 602, 668 P.2d 887, 809, 194 Cal. Rptr.
500, 502 (1983). Agents knew that the vehicle "belonged" to a Lee Bowman. Peti-
tioner's Brief on the Merits at 6, California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066.
55. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d at 602, 668 P.2d at 809, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
56. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2067.
1252 [Vol. 10
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quarter hours later, and when challenged by the agents, related the
account of an exchange. Sexual contacts had been bartered for mari-
juana.51 At the agents' request, the companion returned and knocked
on the door.5 8 The knock brought Carney who then stepped outside
where the waiting agents confronted him.59
An initial search was immediately made of the motor home's inte-
rior without a warrant and without consent.6 0 The agent observed "ma-
rijuana, plastic bags, and a scale of the kind used in weighing drugs on
a table,"'" and then placed Carney in custody.6 2 A subsequent search
at the police station revealed additional marijuana concealed in the
cupboards and refrigerator. 63
Carney's state court history began in the Superior Court of San
Diego County by information charging possession of marijuana for
sale.6 4 At the preliminary hearing, Carney sought unsuccessfully to
suppress the evidence of the two searches. The magistrate concluded
that the evidence seized in the initial search was admissible because the
agent who entered the vehicle was entitled to ascertain the presence or
absence of others.6 5 The subsequent search, the magistrate concluded,
was a permissible routine inventory search. 6 The sole evidentiary basis
upon which the superior court later denied Carney's motion to suppress
was the reporter's transcript of testimony taken at the preliminary
hearing.67 From that record, the superior court decided that probable
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. An agent testified at the preliminary hearing that he "stepped one step
up" to determine for "safety reasons" whether other persons were present. People v.
Carney, 117 Cal. App. 3d 36 (opinion omitted), 172 Cal. Rptr. 430, 433 (1981).
61. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2067.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. The specific section provides as follows: "[e]very person who possesses for
sale any marijuana, except as otherwise provided by law, shall be punished by impris-
onment in the state prison." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11359 (Deering 1984).
65. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2068. Federal courts justify protective sweep searches
as a means of preventing the destruction of evidence and also when particular circum-
stances pose a threat to police or third persons. See United States v. Kunkler, 679 F.2d
187, 191-192 (9th Cir. 1982). For a good analysis of the merits of a general versus a
per se rule authorizing protective sweep searches and practical concerns for their appli-
cation, see Joseph, The Protective Sweep Doctrine: Protecting Arresting Officers from
Attack by Persons Other than the Arrestee, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 95 (1983).
66. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2068.
67. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 4, n.2, California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct.
1986] 1253
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cause existed,68 that the warrantless search was authorized by the auto-
mobile exception, and as an instrumentality of the crime, the motor
home was subject to seizure.6 9
Carney pled nolo contendere and was placed on probation for
three years. The state's appellate court affirmed the trial court's
order." °
Holding that Carney enjoyed fourth amendment protections which
were violated by the warrantless search, the California Supreme Court
reversed Carney's conviction. 71 The state's high court perceived a shift
in the line of cases extending from Carroll. The automobile exception
was no longer principally justified by mobility; instead, the emerging
rationale was the diminished expectation of privacy associated with the
automobile. 2 In addition, the prosecution failed its burden of justifying
the warrantless entry of Carney's motor home under the facts
presented.73
When confronted with the prospect of enlarging the automobile
exception to include motor homes, the California Supreme Court recog-
nized their hybrid nature - motor homes possess a car's attributes of
mobility as well as a home's privacy characteristics. 4 Ultimately, the
court concluded that "a motor home is fully protected by the fourth
amendment and is not subject to the 'automobile exception.' "5 This
conclusion rested squarely on its opinion that the "essential purpose [of
a motor home] is to provide the occupant with living quarters. ' 76
On review granted to the State of California, a six to three justice
majority of the United States Supreme Court rejected the state court's
2066.
68. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2068. Specifically, the superior court found that proba-
ble cause to arrest and a reasonable belief that the motor home contained contraband
were adequately supported by the anonymous phone calls, We Tip information, and the
statement of Carney's companion. Joint Appendix at JA-6-JA-8, Carney, 105 S. Ct. at
2066.
69. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2068.
70. People v. Carney, 117 Cal. 3d 36, 172 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1981).
71. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d at 610, 668 P.2d at 814, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
72. Id. at 605, 668 P.2d at 811, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
73. Id. at 612, 668 P.2d at 816, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
74. People v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 597, 606, 668 P.2d 807, 812, 194 Cal. Rptr.
500, 505 (1983), rev'd sub nom. California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066.
75. Id. at 610, 668 P.2d at 814, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 507. The court noted that
while motor homes were potentially subject to warrantless searches, the justification
must be founded on criteria other than the automobile exception.
76. Id. at 606, 668 P.2d at 812, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
1254 [Vol. 10
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decision. 7 According to California v. Carney, law enforcement officers
need not secure a warrant to search a motor home as long as probable
cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband and exigent circum-
stances coexist. Although it was a case of first impression, the decision
was clearly premised upon those tenets fashioned by the Court sixty
years earlier in Carroll.
A. The Burger Majority
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger commenced with a
review of the cases adhering to Carroll as their precedent. In so doing,
the majority exposed its predisposition for resolving Carney along the
identical lines used to judge the reasonableness of warrantless searches
of automobiles. The opinion recites earlier decisions which traditionally
justified such searches.78
A vehicle's potential for mobility distinguishes it from a stationary
structure. Consequently different considerations have been furthered to
justify the vehicle's being accorded a lesser degree of fourth amend-
ment protection. While a warrant to search one's home may be pre-
sumptively required, the exigent circumstances created by a vehicle
with contraband serve to justify its search without one. The litany re-
cited by Carroll and its line - including Chambers v. Maroney, Cady
v. Dombrowski, Cardwell v. Lewis, South Dakota v. Opperman, and
United States v. Ross - has done little to alter this conclusion over the
past sixty years.79
77. California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985).
78. Id. at 2069.
79. Cited for this proposition are the following cases, each of which expressly
relies upon Carroll: Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) ("the opportunity
to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable"); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.
433, 441 (1973) ("the original justification advanced for treating automobiles differ-
ently from houses, insofar as warrantless searches of automobiles by federal officers
was concerned, was the vagrant and mobile nature of the former"); Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality) ("[a]n underlying factor in the 'Carroll- Cham-
bers' line of decisions has been the exigent circumstances that exist in connection with
movable vehicles"); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976) ("the inher-
ent mobility of automobiles creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical
necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible"); United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806-807 (1982) ("[g]iven the nature of an automobile in
transit ... an immediate intrusion is necessary if police officers are to secure the illicit
substance"). Also cited is Cooper v. State of California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), but it is
properly distinguished from the rest. The Cooper Court opined "that searches of cars
1986] 1255
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Chambers provides an appropriate case model to illustrate these
points. Justice White expressly declined to indicate "every conceivable
circumstance" when a warrantless automobile search could be con-
ducted. 0 Clearly when there is a "fleeting target"8 " or when the "op-
portunity to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable,"8 2 a
search of an auto for particular articles under circumstances of proba-
ble cause must be made immediately. 3 Alternatively, the auto must be
seized and held pending receipt of the magistrate's warrant.8 4 In
Chambers, police were on the lookout for a "light blue compact station
wagon"' 5 within an hour of an armed robbery. 8 At the time it was
stopped, probable cause existed to arrest the occupants and search the
passenger compartment for weapons and stolen property.87 The vehicle,
however, was not searched until its impoundment and the arrest of its
occupants an unspecified time afterward.88 Justice White concluded:
"[tihe probable-cause factor still obtained at the station house and so
did the mobility of the car."8 9 This clear reference to mobility patron-
izes its historical utility as a justification for warrantless open road
searches. Of curiosity, however, is its relevance in the setting of a sta-
tion house impoundment yard.
Two additional rationale explain warrantless vehicle searches. Be-
cause a vehicle's use on the public roadways necessarily exposes it to
pervasive regulation, such as state and local vehicle codes,90 an occu-
that are constantly movable may make the search of a car without a warrant a reason-
able one." Id. at 59. No reliance upon Carroll was expressed nor necessary since the
impounding of the defendant's vehicle was compelled by state statute. Other cases com-
plete the Carroll line but were not cited. See also Husty v. United States, 282 U.S.
694 (1931); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Dyke v. Taylor Imple-
ment Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); and Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266 (1973).
80. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 50.
81. Id. at 52.
82. Id. at 51.
83. id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 44.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 47-48.
88. Id. at 47.
89. Id. at 52.
90. For instances of federal official contact with vehicles on public highways,
Carroll, 267 U.S. 132, and Opperman, 428 U.S. 577, serve to illustrate activity pursu-
ant to express statutory authority. More pervasive contacts occur at state and local
levels as a result of motor vehicle regulation codes, vehicle registration, and operator
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pant does not enjoy the same expectation of privacy she would in her
home. Another explanation is premised upon the vehicle's configura-
tion; since the car's passenger compartment is in plain view it is subject
to public scrutiny.91 Of the two explanations the former proved more
applicable to Carney. The majority was direct in noting that vehicle
regulation arises out of a "compelling governmental need" and derives
its justification from "overriding societal interests in effective law
enforcement. '92
The Court also took note of its prior statements on the scope of
vehicle searches. A Carroll search would appear to extend to the entire
interior of the vehicleY3 In other cases, the Court has upheld searches
of concealed compartments and repository areas within the vehicle.9 4
Inquiry into the scope of a search may also take into account the legal
status of the occupants relative to the vehicle. Carney's connection with
the motor home is unclear. He was known to have been inside the liv-
ing quarters before his arrest. There is also a suggestion that he was
not the registered owner.95 If the incidence of governmental regulation
upon owners and operators is offered to explain their reduced privacy
expectations, it does not necessarily follow that other individuals' ex-
pectations are concomitantly reduced. This contention is irrelevant,
however, in those jurisdictions which hold that no occupant of a vehicle
licensure requirements.
91. Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590.
92. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2070.
93. See supra text accompanying note 21. The Carroll search was conducted
under express authority of the National Prohibition Act. The reduced expectation of
privacy rationale was unnecessary to justify the search without a warrant.
94. See, Ross, 456 U.S. at 825 ("[ijf probable cause justifies the search of a
lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its con-
tents that may conceal the object of the search"); Cady, 413 U.S. at 433 (police, with-
out a warrant, conducted a search of the locked trunk to locate a comatose accident
victim's service revolver. The search of the trunk was justified because police exercised
custody of the vehicle which had been disabled along the highway and, according to
standard departmental procedure, such a search was designed to avert the potential
that the weapon would fall into irresponsible hands); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 47 (police
had probable cause to arrest the occupants of a car suspected of being involved in a
recent robbery and the search of a compartment beneath the dashboard for weapons
and fruits of the crime was justified); United States v. Johns, 105 S. Ct. 881 (1985)
(the initial search of a pickup truck was conducted by customs agents in removing
sealed packages from the vehicle and since the vehicle was reasonably believed to con-
tain contraband, the warrantless search was held to be not unreasonable).
95. See supra note 54.
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may object to its search by a peace officer.9 6 As to Carney's circum-
stances, the majority concluded that the search of the motor home was
not unreasonable and was conducted with abundant probable cause.
Despite the similarities between a motor home and a stationary
home, the majority was convinced that a motor home was aptly suited
to the rationale offered by Carroll and its line of cases.9 7 The Dodge
Mini Motor Home was readily mobile, its license subjected the vehicle
to governmental regulation, and an objective observer could conclude
from its location in a public lot that the motor home was being used for
transportation, as distinguished from residential use. 8
As evidenced by the lack of unanimity in the Carney Court, deci-
sions concerning warrantless vehicle searches have engendered dispa-
rate positions. Commentators, as well as the Court itself, chronicle con-
fusion in this area.99 In an apparent attempt to reduce potential
uncertainty, the majority did speculate as to indicia which might objec-
tively indicate whether or not a warrant need be secured. Objective
factors suggesting the use of a motor home as a residence appear in a
terse footnote. These include its placement on blocks; lack of a license;
connection to utilities; and difficulty in accessing public roads. 100
B. The Stevens Dissent
The dissent 01 attacked the majority on several bases. The automo-
bile exception doctrine relied upon by the majority impliedly favors
governmental interests. Without the exception, government officers
would be hamstrung in their efforts to enforce laws 02 in those settings
96. State v. Hamilton, 264 N.C. 277, 285, 141 S.E. 2d 506, 512 (1965), cert.
denied 384 U.S. 1020.
97. See supra note 79.
98. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2070.
99. See, e.g., Cady, 413 U.S. at 440 (referred to this subject as "something less
than a seamless web"); Ross, 456 U.S. at 817 (characterized the topic as a "troubled
area"); W. LA FAVE, 2 SEARCH AND SEIZURE 509 (1978) (noted that several decisions
in this area are difficult to reconcile, for example, the Chambers' warrantless vehicle
search at the station house lacked those exigent circumstances which were the grava-
men of Carroll, 267 U.S. at 514); and Gardner, Searches and Seizures of Automobiles
and Their Contents: Fourth Amendment Considerations in a Post-Ross World, 62
NEB. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983).
100. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2071 n.3.
101. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2071 (Stevens, J., Brennan, J., and Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
102. Ross, 456 U.S. at 806.
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where a vehicle was transporting contraband. The majority erred for
the following reasons. Because Carney presents facts which concern the
search of a home, albeit motorized, the traditional rationale supporting
the automobile exception is not applicable. 103 Furthermore, the absence
of valuable trial court experience and precedent delimiting motor home
searches necessarily foregoes the evolution of reasoned guiding princi-
ples.104 Controlling precedent, the dissent offered, was established by
the Court's earlier decision of Payton v. New York,10 5 with its bright
line test holding that warrantless searches of a home are presumptively
unreasonable.10 6 Evaluation of the reasonableness of any search must
necessarily include the surroundings in which it is executed. 0 7
Justice Stevens criticized the majority's general willingness to en-
tertain minimally significant fourth amendment cases, such as Carney.
By having granted discretionary review of a state court decision which
would only modestly extend precedent in the subject area, the decision
was improvident. 10 8 In addition, principles of sound court administra-
tion militated against granting review because the conflict was not then
fully percolated. 09
Motor homes are hybrids which possess characteristics of both
permanent structures and vehicles. This prompted Justice Stevens to
encourage the delineation of meaningful guidelines to denote the pres-
ence of fourth amendment interests." 0 Relevant lines of separation in-
103. In no setting are fourth amendment protections of one's privacy clearer than
in one's home. Except under exigent circumstances, a warrant is required to breach the
threshold. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980).
104. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2073.
105. Payton, 445 U.S. 573.
106. Id. at 586.
107. See, Wilson, The Warrantless Automobile Search: Exception Without Jus-
tification, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 127 (1980).
108. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2072.
109. Id. at 2073. Justification for immediate intervention is rare. The Court
should decline review until a conflict has fully percolated. Such a strategy assures that
its decision on matters of national significance will have the benefit of a conflict which
has developed as a result of trial court experimentation and explanation. See, Es-
TREICHER & SEXTON, NEw YORK UNIVERSITY SUPREME COURT PROJECT, Appendix
to the Executive Summary A-4 at 22-23 (198_) as cited in Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2073,
n. 8. This epoch undertaking on the Supreme Court's workload appears in published
form. See, Estreicher and Sexton, New York University Supreme Court Project, 59
N.Y.U. L. REV. (1984). The authors address two points of contention argued by the
Carney dissent for declining to accept jurisdiction (i.e. the conflict was not "fully perco-
lated" and was "improvident"). Id. at 720-744.
110. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2073.
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clude noting whether the vehicle is in motion or at a standstill; the
manner in which it is fixed to the land and its potential to be quickly
moved; characteristics lending to its service as a residence, and the
means of mobility; and finally, whether it is fashioned for use on land
or water.' Lines of distinction can be drawn. The California Vehicle
Code offers evidence. 1 2 Instead, the majority's categorical treatment of
motor homes summarily denies distinctions which might be applied to
differentiate the diverse lifestyles known to benefit from mobile living
and the variety of uses to which motor homes are suited." 3
The focal point of the dissent's argument is the recognition that at
the time a motor home's owner dwells within, there exists a "substan-
tial and legitimate expectation of privacy.""11 4 No doubt such vehicles
are susceptible to warrantless searches, but only when traveling on a
public thoroughfare or when an immediate search is necessitated by
exigent circumstances."15 The Carney facts were noted to lack exigency
for three reasons: first, the motor home was parked in a public lot and
not traveling on a public roadway; second, a warrant could have been
secured from a magistrate available in the courthouse only a few blocks
distant;" 6 and third, a statutory procedure existed to secure a warrant
over the telephone." 7
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 243 (Deering 1984) ("A 'camper' is a structure
designed to be mounted upon a motor vehicle and to provide facilities for human
habitation or camping purposes. A camper having one axle shall not be considered a
vehicle"); and CAL. VEH. CODE § 362 (Deering 1984) ("'[a] house car' is a motor
vehicle originally designed, or permanently altered, and equipped for human habita-
tion, or to which a camper has been permanently attached...
113. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2073.
114. Id. at 2075.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2076.
117. Id. at n. 16. This argument does not appear in Respondent's briefs. The
dissent relied upon CAL. PENAL CODE § 1526(b) (Deering 1983) ("[i]n lieu of the
written affidavit ... the magistrate may take an oral statement under oath which shall
be recorded and transcribed. The transcribed statement shall be deemed to be an affi-
davit for the purposes of this chapter."). This telephone warrant procedure was consid-
ered sufficient to protect fourth amendment rights as well as satisfy police concerns
regarding loss of evidence. Significantly, exigent circumstances which give rise to war-
rantless searches necessarily are limited by this procedure. People v. Morrongiello, 145
Cal. App. 3d 1, 12-13, 193 Cal. Rptr. 105, 111 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). By way of
further illustration, the federal courts also permit the issuance of a warrant upon oral
testimony. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(D). The procedure is "intended for situations in
which it is not practicable to present a written affidavit to a magistrate or judge, and is
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Because no exigency existed, the dissenters argued that the major-
ity's decision rested upon a conclusive presumption. That is, exigency
arises solely as a result of a motor home's inherent mobility. This con-
clusion, they insist, offends Carroll"" where exigency arose not from
mere mobility but due to practical necessity. It also is contrary to the
Court's holding in United States v. Chadwick,"9 where a footlocker
stored in a car trunk was subjected to a warrantless search by federal
agents. Like a motor vehicle, a footlocker is inherently mobile. How-
ever, the Chadwick Court noted that the footlocker was double-locked
and as such demonstrated the owner's desire that its contents remain
free from public inspection. Mobility alone offers an insufficient basis
for abandoning the warrant requirement. 120
Carney's Dodge Mini Motor Home exhibited both exterior and in-
terior clues that it contained a living space. 12' These indications were
sufficient to communicate the need for obtaining a warrant, failing
which the search without coexistent exigency became "presumptively
unreasonable."' 22
IV. The Carney Search Standard
Searches of motor homes are justified only to the extent that they
are reasonable. 23 The standard of reasonableness articulated by the
Carney Court demands an inquiry by the prospective searcher into cir-
cumstances regarding the vehicle's mobility and its location. 24
A vehicle's ready mobility has been used to justify warrantless
searches for sixty years.125 Although the degree of mobility 26 was un-
necessary to communicate with the magistrate by telephone, radio, or other electronic
methods" (emphasis supplied). 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
670.1 (1982).
118. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 132.
119. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 4 (1977).
120. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2076 citing Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 1.
121. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2077. The dissent noted appointments within the vehi-
cle which were designed to accommodate habitation, such as stuffed chairs, table,
bunk-beds, kitchen, etc.
122. United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
123. See supra note 1.
124. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2070-2071.
125. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 132.
126. Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 835, 842 (1974).
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defined in the seminal case of United States v. Carroll,127 this aspect of
the inquiry is clearly founded upon long established precedent. The rec-
ord's silence concerning mobility of the Carney motor home and the
Court's bare conclusion that it evidenced ready mobility suggest that
Carney's contribution to the notion of mobility must await case-by-case
decision making. Adding to the uncertainty are interpretive difficulties
with the search standard. The dissent interpreted the Court's opinion as
creating a per se rule: if a motor home is mobile, treat it like a car.
Period. Or restated, a motor home's inherent mobility creates a conclu-
sive presumption of exigency. Another interpretation defines mobility
as active use for transportation. Between the two interpretations lie the
as yet unreported questions of fact. The following points serve to illus-
trate. One can easily distinguish a motor home on the move and a mo-
tor home at a standstill. The former satisfies the standard yet the latter
may not. If a parked motor home possesses the capacity for ready mo-
bility, arguably the standard is met. If a motor home lacks the capacity
for ready mobility, as when it is mechanically disabled, a warrantless
search under Carney is, arguably, unreasonable. These distinctions be-
tween ready mobility and immobility are more than academic. Because
they may reveal the existence of a protected constitutional interest, in-
quiry cannot be made cavalierly.
To justify a warrantless search of a motor home, in addition to its
being readily mobile, Chief Justice Burger implied that it must be situ-
ated in a location which objectively indicates active use for transporta-
tion rather than residence. 128 Because the Carney motor home was
parked in a public lot, its setting objectively indicated its use for trans-
portation. Consequently, the majority found it unnecessary to consider
the application of the warrant exception to a motor home found in a
setting which objectively indicated its use as a residence. a29 The deci-
sion however did propose distinctions to aid in identifying residential
versus transportation use.a3 0 Indicia of a motor home's use for transpor-
tation include the display of a license and convenient access to public
roads.13' A motor home elevated on blocks and hooked up to utilities
127. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 132.
128. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2071. Historically, the automobile exception has
turned on the vehicle's presence in a "setting that objectively indicates that [it] is being
used for transportation" (emphasis supplied). Id. at 2070-2071.
129. Id. at 2071 n.3.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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suggests its use for residential purposes.132 However, the Court ex-
pressly declined to decide which motor homes were "worthy" or "un-
worthy" of fourth amendment protections. 33 Because a Carney search
demands objective analysis on the part of the prospective searcher, the
general nature of the standard theoretically permits its practical use in
the varied circumstances in which a motor home might be found. Nev-
ertheless, for the explanations offered above, practitioners must look
beyond the limited Carney facts and opinion to find reasoned guiding
principles.
More fundamental than the concerns for the conceptual and
mechanical application of the Carney search standard is the impact of
the Burger Court's decision upon fourth amendment doctrine. How do
protected individual interests fare under the standard? Two cases sug-
gest the answer. In Cardwell v. Lewis, T13 the Court considered the
search of the automobile which was found in a public parking lot.
Though seized from a public setting, the Cardwell auto posed no threat
of flight. The search consisted of paint scrapings taken from the exte-
rior and a tire tread observation made while the vehicle was im-
pounded135 and its owner in police custody.138 There was no privacy
infringement. 37 Nor was there any impermissible privacy infringement
in Carney where an interior cabin search was conducted in a public
parking lot for "safety reasons." 38 The motor home did exhibit a po-
tential for ready movement.139 In combination, these two cases expose
an ever broadening perspective from which the Court will assess future
warrantless vehicle searches. Ultimately, critical fourth amendment
analysis will not be lost on distinctions between interior and exterior
searches, between automobile and mobile residence searches, for they
will have become one. Carroll and Carney however most vividly illus-
trate the extent to which individual interests have yielded to the
Court's construction of the fourth amendment.
In 1925, the Carroll Court considered a roadside warrantless
search of an Oldsmobile roadster smuggling bootleg whiskey. In 1985,
the Carney Court considered a warrantless search of a parked Dodge
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2070.
134. Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 585.
135. See supra text accompanying note 39.
136. Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 587.
137. Id. at 591.
138. See supra text accompanying note 60.
139. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2070.
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Mini Motor Home containing marijuana. In each case, the Court justi-
fied the respective search principally on the grounds that the vehicle's
potential for ready movement forewarned potential for flight. This logic
derives from an historic anomaly 40 and is inapposite to the fourth
amendment protections which were designed to insulate the individual
from arbitrary and indiscriminate exercise of governmental author-
ity.14' Insofar as one's home happens to be mobile, the Carney search
formulation seems to have left a gaping hole in his constitutional guar-
antees against such an exercise.
What privacy interests a motor home owner may have, are pro-
tected, if at all, by the requirement that a prospective searcher objec-
tively conclude that the vehicle's location in a setting suggests its use as
a residence. With that thread, Carney has sought to restitch the consti-
tutional protective fabric left tattered by the unfortunate application of
the Carroll automobile exception to a modern-day phenomenon, the
motor home.
V. Summary
California v. Carney"' is a bold addition to fourth amendment
doctrine. Since the early history of our Republic, the home has been
regarded as the area most deserving protection from governmental in-
trusion. In 1985, however, to the extent one's home evinces ready mo-
bility, the Supreme Court by the force of a 6:3 decision held that such
protection is no longer assured. 43
Carney's holding is uncomplicated. In the context of the fourth
amendment, a motor home is more like a car than a home. And like a
car, a motor home is presumptively susceptible to being searched with-
out a warrant, assuming the presence of probable cause to search in the
first place.
In the main, the fourth amendment requires law enforcement of-
ficers to secure a warrant before conducting a search. To uphold the
warrantless search in Carney, the Court relied upon the automobile ex-
ception doctrine. Automobiles are excepted for essentially two reasons.
The same rationale now obtains to motor home searches. First, a vehi-
140. See supra notes 10, 28 and 29 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
142. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2066.
143. Id.
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cle's intrinsic mobility oftentimes makes securing a warrant futile. 14
Potential for ready movement forewarns potential for flight. Second, a
vehicle's exposure to pervasive governmental regulation of the road-
ways creates a reduced expectation of privacy.' 45 Similarly, a vehicle's
configuration exposes the passenger compartment to public view which
in turn reduces the privacy expectations of the occupant. 146
The challenged governmental actions in Carney were the warrant-
less search of the Dodge Mini Motor Home, as it stood parked in a
public lot in downtown San Diego, and the seizure of an unspecified
quantity of marijuana from the living area. 14 7 The Carney search stan-
dard required that Drug Enforcement Administration agents secure a
warrant to search unless circumstances permitted two objective conclu-
sions - that the motor home was readily mobile and that the vehicle's
location indicates its active use for transportation rather than
residence.14
The sole evidentiary basis for Carney's conviction appears in a
suppression hearing transcript.' 49 That probable cause existed to search
is abundantly clear.' 50 Left unclear are facts which convincingly sup-
port the Court's reliance upon the automobile exception. To the con-
trary, the following suggest that this doctrine is illsuited to the Carney
record; for example, drawn interior window shades reflect the occu-
pants' heightened, not reduced, privacy expectations; a motor home
parked within the confines of a public lot, in excess of the 75 minutes
from the time agents first suspected ongoing illicit activity, failed to
present exigency of such practical necessity that the rule requiring the
securing of a search warrant should be circumvented. The outcome
compels support from an altogether different rationale.' 5 '
The automobile exception is a judicial creation. Its aim - to aid
legitimate law enforcement interests - was first expressed in the prohi-
bition era case, United States v. Carroll.52 In that decision, the Court
sharpened the teeth of the National Prohibition Act' 53 by upholding
144. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
145. See supra note 90.
146. Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590.
147. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2067.
148. Id. at 2070-2071.
149. See supra note 67.
150. See supra note 68.
151. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
152. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
153. See supra note 11.
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federal agents' action in conducting a warrantless roadside search of an
Oldsmobile roadster transporting bootleg whiskey. 5 Though both the
Act and the constitutional mandate which authorized it have long since
been repealed, 55 the legacy continues. Sixty years after Carroll, Chief
Justice Burger reasserted its aim by allowing "the essential purposes
served by the exception to be fulfilled.' 56
Carney's contribution to the evolving character of the fourth
amendment suggests a paradoxical result. Despite its boldness, the
Court's predisposed assertion favoring governmental anti-crime pur-
suits will likely yield only nominal influence on law enforcement prac-
tice. As the record demonstrates, other exceptions may more clearly
legitimize warrantless searches. Carney's principal legacy is the shift
which it reflects in the doctrinal perspective of the Court. Traditional
safeguards respecting the search of one's home are today less assured.
The decision offers a head-on challenge to the certainty of Justice
Brandeis' caveat - "in every extention of governmental functions lurks
a new danger to civil liberty.' 5
David C. Hawkins
154. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 132.
155. See supra notes 14 and 15.
156. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2071.
157. United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v.
Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 436 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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